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The Florida Supreme Court decided about two hundred cases during
the period reported from January 6, 1955, through March 17, 1955. Those
opinions (excluding memorandum decisions and a few others not con-
sidered of sufficient importance to be noted here) found from 76 So.2d
137 to 77 So.2d 880 are herewith reported. In addition five federal cases
interpretative of Florida law are included. These cases were found from
215 F.2d 148 to 217 F.2d 840 (1955); and 124 F. Supp. 254 to 126 F. Supp.
744 (1955).
Attorneys. Disciplinary proceeding. A disciplinary proceeding is not
a usual adversary proceeding. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the Supreme
Court to determine whether an attorney, who had been granted an oppor-
tunity of reducing his suspension by paying the costs of the proceeding,
should be relieved of any item included in the statement of cost.'
BILLS AND NorrEs. Banks: Holder in due course. The plaintiff-bank
supplied an implement dealer with contract and note forms containing a
small advertisement of the bank in one corner. Various finance companies
had purchased such notes and contracts from the implement dealer. The
bank was not obligated to, and in fact did not, purchase all such notes
and contracts. The mere appearance of the advertisement on the forms
did not preclude the bank from being a holder in due course without
notice of infirmities in the instruments sued on.2
CoNsTnrroxloNaL LAw. Criminal Law: Rape. The defendant was
convicted of rape. He appealed on the grounds that the circuit court,
which has criminal jurisdiction in capital cases only, did not have jurisdiction
to try, convict and sentence the appellant to the penalty of death. This
contention was based upon the provisions of the Child Molester Act s as
amended,4 which would limit the sentence to twenty-five years imprison-
ment. The Supreme Court held that the Child Molester Act was unconstitu-
tional because of insufficient title, and that therefore the circuit court had
jurisdiction to try the defendant and impose a death penalty upon the
verdict of guilty without a recommendation of mercy.5
*This issue of the Quarterly Synopsis was written by Donald S. Zuekernian and
edited by Jerry Mosca.
. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Murrell, 76 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1954).
2. Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Stepp, 126 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
3. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1953).
4. Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28158.
5. Copeland v. State, 76 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1951).
459
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Due process: Eminent domain. The government sought to condemn
a large number of tracts of realty. The value of 236 of the tracts was
contested, and the owners of those 236 tracts were represented by twelve
separate attorneys or law firms. The taking of evidence on the issue of
value consumed scven weeks. The jury was swamped by an incredible
volume of figures and general data. 'The United States Court of Appeals
held that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the case
to be presented before one jury, which retired for deliberation only after
all evidence of value had been entered as to all tracts. The owners were
denied due process.6
Federal gambling stamp. The statutory section7 which provided that
the holding, owning, having in possession or paying tax for a federal
gambling stamp shall be prima facie evidence against the holder in any
prosecution of such holder for a violation of state gambling laws, is
unconstitutional.
8
Grand jury: Self incrimination. The Supreme Court held that questions
asked the relators and petitioners before a grand jury were sufficient to
connect them with criminal communism. Hence, commitment to jail,
for refusal to answer such questions oii the ground of constitutional privi-
lege" against self-incrimination, was without legal authority. Relators and
petitioners were ordered discharged.'
Innkeepers. A statute" requires hotels, motels and other rooming houses
to advertise full details of room charges when they advertise their rates.
The Supreme Court held that such a statute is within the legislative pre-
rogative to enact social legislation and does not deprive advertisers of equal
protection of the law.' 2
CoN'rtcrs. Brokers: Commission. A contract between the vendors
and the broker specified no time in which the broker was to perform
services. A period of eighteen months had elapsed between the time of
the broker's finding eventual purchasers, who were unwilling to pay the
price then demanded by the vendors, and the time when the vendors had
sold to the purchasers for a smaller amount than previously demanded.
There had been no continuous negotiations between the broker and the
purchasers; therefore, the vendor had had the right to assume that the
broker had abandoned efforts in connection with the sale and they had
been at liberty to sell the property to the purchasers without incurring
liability for a commission.' 3
6. Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954).
7. 1LA. STAT. §§ 849.01, 901.01, 902.13 (1953).
8. Jefferson v. Sweat, 76 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1954).
9. FLA. STAT. 876.01, 876.02, (4,5), 876.03; FLA. CONST. DECLARATION OF
RICtrS, § 12.
10. State v. Kelly, 76 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
11. FLA. STAT. § 511.45 (1953).
12. Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Association, 77 So.2d 465 (Fla. 1955).
13. Shuler v. AlIen, 76 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1955).
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Counties: Bonds. The appellants, securities dealers, were employed
by the Board of County Commissioners to act as financial advisors. Their
function was to insure a valid issuance of county courthouse and hospital
bonds and sale thereof for the best price possible. Upon tabulation of
the bids, it was ascertained that the bid of the appellants was highest.
Thus, they were the purchasers of the bonds. The Supreme Court held
that this did not preclude the appellants' recovery from the appellees for
services rendered as such advisors. 14
Insurance Policies: Recovery. An action was brought by the beneficiary
to recover benefits payable under a life insurance policy. The policy pro-
vided that the agreement was null and void if the insured's death resulted
directly or indirectly from the intentional act of any person. The Supreme
Court held that this provision precluded recovery for the death of the
insured as a result of a stab wound in the heart intentionally inflicted
by another, regardless of intent to kill the insured.15
Modifications: Oral Agreement. An action was brought for the breach
of an alleged oral contract for an exclusive sales agency. The evidence was
as consistent with the hypothesis that the parties acted under a written
contract as with the hypothesis that the parties acted under an alleged
oral contract. Therefore, the rule that a written contract may be altered
or modified by oral agreement, if the oral agreement has been accepted
and acted on by the parties in such a manner as would work a fraud
on either party to refuse to enforce it, was not applicable.16
Rescission: Estate by the entireties. An agreement between a mother
and daughter purported to create an estate in property by the entireties.
In law, an estate by the entireties can only be created between man
and wife. However, the instrument was sufficient to create an agreement
between the parties not to partition the property and to vest title thereof
in the survivor to said agreement. The Supreme Court held that if either
of the parties under this agreement could show a breach by the other,
or show that the other party had made it unequitable or unduly burden-
some for the complaining party to live by the contract, she would be
entitled to have the contract rescinded and to have the rights of the
parties adjudicated 1 7
CORPORATIONS. Stock. The statutes18 and corporate charter authorized
a stockholders' agreement providing that, when a debt evidenced by a pledge
or encumberance of stock was in default, other stockholders could pay
the amount of the debt and release the stock from encumbrance. The
buyer on foreclosure of the pledge of stock bought with notice of such
14. Leedy, Wheeler & Allemnan, Inc. v. Okaloose County, 77 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1955).
15. Golden v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co., 77 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1955).
16. Harris v. Air Conditioning Corporation, 76 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1955).
17. Forehand v. Peacock, 77 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1955).
18. FLA. STAT. §§ 610.03, 612.03 (1953).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
an agreement. Therefore, he took the stock subject to the agreement
and became subrogated to the rights of the pledgee as against the corpora-
tion and stockholders. 9
CRIMINAL LAW. Burglary. The defendant was convicted of breaking
and entering a dwelling in the nighttime with intent to commit a mis-
demeanor. The prosecutrix testified that the defendant rang the doorbell
and said he wanted to come in and then kicked out the screen of the
door and entered. This testimony disproved the necessary element of
stealthiness, 0 therefore the conviction was void.
2'
Evidence: Appeal. The defendant was convicted on each of two
informations charging (1) possession for purpose of sale, and (2) sale
of obscene literature. On motion, the defendant was required to elect
the case from which he desired to appeal.23 Evidence of the sale of obscene
literature to a witness other than the one named as buyer in the informa-
tion was admissible for the purpose of showing intent or purpose for which
the defendant had the literature in his possession. 3
Forfeiture: Inotixcating liquors. In a proceeding for forfeiture of a
truck and load of gins and whiskies, an intent to resell the liquor within
the state could not be presumed. In the absence of evidence upon the
point, the evidence did not sustain trial court's implied finding of illegal24
transportation.2
Forgery. The defendant represented to a merchant that he had
organized a baseball team known as the "Gainesville All Stars"; that if
the merchant would contribute funds for the purchase of a uniform, his
name would be written across the back of the uniform for advertising
purposes. The merchant gave the defendant a check made payable to the
"Gainesville All Stars." The defendant endorsed the check "Gainesville
All Stars" using the name of a fictitious individual and cashed the check.
The defendant was guilty of "forgery" 28 under the forgery statute.2
Habitual Criminal: Habeas corpus. The petitioner was sentenced to
life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. In a habeas corpus proceeding
he contended that his sentence was void because of his prior convictions
was in excess of the maximum sentence allowed by statute. The Supreme
Court held that the habitual offender statute,28 in providing that persons
three times convicted should be punishable under its terms, did not con-
template imposition of valid sentences as a necessary condition precedent
19. Weissman v. Lincoln Corporation, 76 So. 2d 478 (F1a. 1954).
20. FLA. STAT. § 810.07 (1953).
21. Peters v. State, 76 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1954).
22. Sirrning v. State, 77 So.2d 833 (Ha. 1955).
23. Rocklin v. State, 61 So.2d 484 (Ha. 1952).
24. FLA. STAT. § 562.07 (1953).
25. Townsend v. State, 76 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1955).
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 674.11 (3), 674.69, 831.01 (1953).
27. Green v. State, 76 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1954),
28. Washington v. Mayo, 77 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1955).
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to its applicability. Therefore, the defense of a prior excessive sentence
did not act as an invalidation of the habitual offender proceedings.20
Larceny. The defendants, who allegedly stole one hundred and twenty-
seven boxes of oranges, could properly be charged with the offense of
grand larceny,30 rather than with the offense of taking fruit from a citrus
grove.
32
COURTS. Appeal: Costs. The Supreme Court held that where minors
were personally wholly unable to pay the costs of appeal, they were entitled
to the benefits of the insolvency statute32 for the purpose of taking the
appeal. This notwithstanding that their families might be able to bear
such costs.13
Appeal: Directed verdict. The evidence presented in a former appeal
was exactly the same as that used in a second trial. The United States
Court of Appeals held that the decision in the former appeal became the
law of the case and as this court found at that time that it was not
proper for a directed verdict to be granted, a directed verdict on the
same evidence, by the trial court, will not now be allowed to stand.8'
Appeal and Error: Negligence. An action was brought by a motorist
against a railroad trustee for injuries to his person and property. In
the absence of a railroad watchman, automatic signals or gates, the
automobile driven by the plaintiff collided with a train at a crossing. A
municipal ordinance provided that the crossing was to be guarded by a
watchman, or, that automatic devices were to be used. The Supreme Court
held that the admission of evidence concerning the mayor's apparent verbal
attempt, in a conversation with the railroad superintendent, to counter-
mand the ordinance, and a refusal to grant the motorist's requested charge
that the ordinance was in effect, constituted reversible error.85
Appeal and Error: Privileged communications. The plaintiff in a pater-
nity proceeding admitted that reversible error had been committed. The
error was committed by permitting the defendant's former wife to testify
concerning a communication made to her by the defendant at a time when
the marital relationship was still in effect. Based on this the Supreme Court
reversed the decree in favor of the plaintiff.8 0
Criminal Law: New trial. In a criminal action the burden is upon
the state37 to show either an abuse of discretion, or a reversible error
committed by the trial judge in granting a motion for a new trial. 8
29. FtA. STAT. §§ 775.10, 810.03 (1951).
30. FLA. STAT. § 821.12 (Fla. 1953).
31. Luther v. State, 76 So.2d 276 (Pla. 1954).
32. FLA. STAT. § 924.17 (1953).
33. Lawrence v. State, 76 So.2d 271 (la. 1954).
34. Rexford v. Royal Indemnity Company, 215 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1954).
35. Trabulsy v. Loftin, 76 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1954).
36. Brown v. May, 76 So.2d 652 (Fla. 1954).
37. FLA. STAT. § 924.13 (1953).
38. State v. Hill, 76 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1954).
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Criminal Law: Plea. The defendant was convicted of burglary after
entering a plea of guilty. The trial court refused to permit the defendant,
who was a niature, college-educated man, to withdraw his plea,'1 though
lie had entered same without benefit of counsel. The defendant contended
that lie had been ignorant of the consequences of his plea. The Supreme
Court held that under the circumstances the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its refusal, and affirmed the judgment.
4 0
Declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment provided that the court
would retain jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the cause
in order to entertain such further proceedings therein as might be proper.
This was contrued to mean that the circuit judge, sitting as chancellor
would consider any and all equitable claims which the appellant might
appropriately present to him.
4 1
Descent and distribution: Proof. A stepson, who had petitioned for his
appointment as curator of the property of his stepfather, should have been
given the opportunity to prove his right to institute such proceedings by
showing that the stepfather did not have a living father, mother, brother,
or sister, or collateral heirs of closer kin than a stepson.4 2 If the stepson
prevailed upon such an issue, he should be heard upon the question whether
lie should be appointed to take charge of the stepfather's property. 43
Habeas corpus: Sentence. An information charging in separate counts
desertion of minor children and withholding means of support from such
children, charged but one offense. 44 Hence, detention of the defendant for
more than one year, under consceutive sentences of one year imposed on
each count, was unlawful. The defendant was entitled to discharge on
habeas corpus?4
Witnesses: Fees. The Supreme Court held that fees for the testimony of
an expert witness would be reduced in accordance with the provisions of
the statute46 setting the fee for an expert witness at $10 per hour.4 7
CREDITOR'S RIGH'rs. Injunction. A creditor's action was maintained
against an heir at law to enjoin the distribution of a distributive share
which had allegedly been fraudulently transferred. The transferees were
indispensable parties and the action could, therefore, not proceed without
their joinder, notwithstanding the equity rule 8 which placed the court
"at liberty to make a decree saving the rights of absent parties. ' 49
39. FLA. SrAT. § 909.13 (1953).
40. Stratton v. State, 77 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1955).
41. Priest v. Logan, 76 So.2d 883 ( a. 1955).
42. ILA. STAr. § 747,08 (1951).
43. Grant v. Odom, 76 So.2d 287 ([la. 1954).
44. FLA. STA'r. § 856.04 (1951).
45. Stephens v. Mayo, 76 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1954).
46. FLA. STAT. § 90,231 (2) (1953).
47. I. J. Granger & Sons v. Clay County Farns, 77 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1955).
48. FL.A. STAT. § 726.01 (1953); FLA. EQ2UITY Rui.rs or PROCroUnV., rule 18
(1953).
49. Martinez v. Baljin, 76 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1954).
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DAMAGES. Negligence. The plaintiff complained of and was treated
for pain in her back and legs. I-let condition was deemed neurotic by the
defendant's physician. The alleged injuries were sustained in an automobile
accident with the defendant. There was no issue of liability in the case.
The court held that an award of $2000 for injuries and pain and suffering
would be made to the woman, who was entitled to at least
nominal damages. 50
DOMESTIC RELATIONS. Divorce: Decree pro confesso. A wife had been
properly served with an original bill in the nature of a review to set aside
her divorce judgment. The amended bill, which the husband filed but
did not serve, did not supersede the original bill, and the husband could
take a decree pro confesso on the original bill. 1
Guardian and ward. A mother of minor children must be notified of
proceedings for the appointment of guardianship, as required by the
Guardianship Law.52 Where the mother is not so notified, an order ap-
pointing a guardian is inoperative as to her. 53
Support: Bastards. The evidence in a proceeding to reduce the amount
of child care payments,5 4 required of the defendant in a bastardy case,
disclosed that if there had been any change in the defendant's condition,
it was for the better. Therefore, reducing the amounts required in the
original decree was an abuse of discretion. "
EQUITY. Garnishment. The Supreme Court held that a writ of gar-
nishment= 0 may issue in aid of a final decree in equity providing solely for
the payment of money. Such an equity decree, when properly recorded,
is just as much a lien as is a judgment of a court of law.57
Labor relations: Injunction. Various sub-lessees of a theater had de-
faulted in payments to the musicians hired to perform at the theater.
Thereafter, the local musicians' union listed the theater as a defaulter
and refused to accept a contract for its members to work there for an-
other sub-lessee until past defaults were paid up. Such action was not in
itself illegal but amounted to nothing more than an attempt by the union
to require the owner to underwrite the debt. Therefore, the court would
not grant injunctive relief to the theater owner and operator claiming
injury.68
Mechanics' liens: Foreclosure. A materialman never gave home owners
cautionary notice of his intention to claim his lien. The home owners
50. DeLoach v. Lanier, 125 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Fla. 1954).
51. Davidson v. Davidson, 76 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1954).
52. FLA, STAT. § 744.01 (1953).
53. Hughes v. Bunker, 76 So.2d 474 (Fla. 1954).
54. FLA. STAT. § 742.06 (1951).
55. Crosby v. Calhoun, 76 So.2d 297 (fla. 1954).
56. FLA. STAT. § 7701 (1953); FTrA. RlITES OF CIVT PRO. rule 3.15.
57. Gordman Corporation v. Bethell Construction Co., 77 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1955).
58. Miami Federation of Musicians v. Wompearce, Inc,, 76 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1954).
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had no knowledge that the jalousies which the contractor had installed
belonged to any one other than the contractor. The materialman so con-
ducted himself as to allow the home owners to infer that the jalousies
were the property of the contractor. The materialman, therefore, could
not assert his mechanics' lien against the home owners. So held, despite
the fact that the home owners had failed to obtain, upon final payment,
a sworn statement ' from the contractor relating to the liens. 0
Specific performance: Vendor and purchaser. The vendors were hus-
band and wife. It was peculiarly within their knowledge that their con-
tract for the sale of a ranch had not been signed by them in the presence
of two witnesses. They had delivered the contract to their own broker
with the understanding that he have two witnesses subscribe their names
before the contract was sent to the purchasers. The vendors thereby led
the purchasers to perform the contract, incur expenses, and materially
change their position.6 ' The vendors were thereby estopped to contend
that the contract was unenforceable because it was not signed by the vendors
in the presence of two witnesses.62
Suit in interpleader: Escrow agent. An escrow agent had in its posses-
sion funds which were the subject matter of a controversy between the
parties to a contract for the purchase of real estate. The agent disclaimed
any interest in the funds. The Supreme Court held that it was proper
for the escrow agent to invoke the jurisdiction of the equity court, in a
suit in interpleader, to settle the parties' rights. '
Suit to quiet title: Municipal deeds. The plaintiff's chain of title in-
cluded a quitclaim deed executed in 1952 by the Mayor and Clerk of the
City and was duly authorized by the city council. The defendant's claim
of title included a quitclaim deed executed in 1943 by the Mayor and
Clerk but allegedly unauthorized by the council, as required by a city
ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the 1943 deed was merely void-
able, not absolutely void. Therefore, the validity of the deed may not be
collaterally attacked in a suit, to which the city is not a party"
ExEMrnONs. Homestead. The acts of a husband in making monthly
payments on his wife's property and painting the kitchen and bathroom of
such property will not make the property homestead property, even though
the husband and wife may be living on the property. 5
Insurance. A statute66 exempts cash surrender values of insurance
policies on the lives of residents of the state from attachment, garnishment
59. FLA. STAT. § 94.04 (1), (3) (1953).
60. Southern Supply Distributors v. Landsdell, 76 So.2d 266 (Fla. 1954).
61. FLA. STAT. § 689.01 (1953).
62. Cox v. LaPota, 76 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1954).
63. Drummond Title Company v. Weinroth, 77 So. 2(1 606 (Fla. 1955).
64. Goldtrap v. Bryan, 77 So,2d 446 (Fla. 1955).
65. De Jonge v. Wayne, 76 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1954).
66. FLA. STAT. § 222.14 (Fla. 1953).
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or legal process in favor of the insured's creditors. The statute is not in-
applicable to such values of policies issued before the insured became a
resident of the state, where he resides therein when the values are sought
to be subjected to garnishment or other legal process.6 7
INSURANCE. Hospitalization: Policy rider. The insured was indemified
against expenses incurred for hospital care and nursing services. After
the insured developed carcinoma of the breast, the insurer paid the in-
sured's claim and cancelled the policy. Later, the policy was revived by
attaching a rider which provided for exclusion of liability for "Carcinoma
or any Disease of the Breast and/or operation therefor." The Supreme
Court held that the rider did not exclude the insurer's liability when the
insured developed carcinoma of the stomach or intestine.68
INTERNAL REVENUE. Cost of goods sold. The court held that the
amount paid by the taxpayer for materials purchased, though in excess of
O.P.A. wholesale ceiling prices, must be considered as part of the cost of
goods sold by the taxpayer for the purpose of computing income and excess
profits to taxes.69
LABOR RELATIONS. Injunction: Appeal and error. The plaintiff failed
to give a bond on the entering of a temporary injunction. The chancellor
was directed to dissolve the injunction or require the posting of an injunc-
tion bond. The amount was to be sufficient to indemnify the petitioner
for such costs and damages as it might incur or suffer in the event that it
ultimately be determined that it was wrongfully enjoined or restrained by
the temporary injunction.7
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Innkeeper and guest. In a negligence action,
the appellant contended that the relationship of innkeeper and guest
existed. The court, in support of this argument, stated that although there
was in fact, a so-called lease agreement, the incidents and services to be
performed under the agreement, such as maid service and garbage disposal,
were more indicative of an innkeeper-guest relationship than that of land-
lord-tenant.7 2
REa ESTATE. Brokers: Commission. An action was brought by a real
estate broker to recover commissions. The eventual sale was consummated
on terms different from the original listing contract. It was also more than
a year later and more than six months after the seller's rejection of an offer
different from the original listing contract. There was no showing of
negotiations by the seller and purchaser at the instance of the broker.
Under these circumstances the broker was not entitled to a commission.7
67. Slateoff v. Dezen, 76 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1954).
68. Rigel v. National Casualty Company, 76 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
69. Naffco, Inc. v. Fahs, 126 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Fla. 1954).
70. FLA. STAT. § 64.03 (1953).
71. International Brotherhood, etc. v. Miami Retail Groc., 76 So.2d 49 (Fla.
1954).
72. Goodell v. Morris Lansburgh and Associates, 77 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1955).
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Mortgages: Estoppel. The plaintiff sued to re-establish a mortgage on
the ground that satisfaction thereof was procured as a result of alleged
fraud or mistake. The plaintiff-mortgagee had knowledge of the fact that
the party entrusted with the money to satisfy the mortgage had misap-
propriated the funds. Instead of promptly notifying the mortgagors of this,
the mortgagee continued to deal with the mortgagors and to redeposit a
bad check, drawn on these funds. The Supreme Court held that equity
would not assist the plaintiff in re-establishing its mortgage under the
circumstances. The plaintiff was estopped to enforce the mortgage lien as
against the defendant-mortgagors as innocent third parties.7
4
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS. Compensation of officers. The legisla-
ture had authority to reduce the compensation of a member of the Board
of Public Instruction of Dade County from two-hundred dollars to what
he could save from an allowance of ten-dollars under the general statute
75
for each meeting he attended.
T
Constitutional Law. The constitutional provision 7 that a tax levied
for payment of interest and principal of bonds of special tax school districts
shall not be applied to any purpose other than payment of the principal
arid interest of bonds, does not bar accrual of interest on defaulted coupons. 7
STATUTES. Death: Future earnings. An action was brought for wrong-
ful death and under the survival statute,79 for loss of decedent's earnings
for her life expectancy. The Supreme Court held that under the survival
statute there can be no recovery for impairment of earning capacity beyond
the death of the injured person. 80
Railroad and Public Utilities Commission: Jurisdiction. A proposed
route of an automobile limousine service did not lie wholly within the
corporate limits of any city or town or entirely within the cities and towns
whose boundaries adjoined. The Railroad and Public Utilities Commis-
sion had jurisdiction to grant a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity. It was not precluded from doing so by a statutory provision,8 ' ex-
empting from regulation of the commission, operations between cities and
towns whose boundaries adjoined. 2
TORTS. Contributory negligence: Innkeepers. The plaintiff was a paying
guest in the defendant's hotel. She entered a dark hallway knowing of
73. Burbridge v. Berk, 77 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1955).
74. United Service Corp. v. \I-AN Construction Corp., 77 So2d 800 (Fla. 1955).
75. FLA. STAT. § 242.02 (1953).
76. Graham v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, 76 So.2d 874 (Fla.
1955. FLA. CONST. Art. 12, § 17 (1953).
78. In re Board of Public Instruction, 76 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1955).
79. FLA. STAT. §§ 45.11, 768,01 (1953).
80. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So.2d 845 (Vla. 1955).
81. FLA. STAT. § 323.29 (1953).
82. Roberts v. Carter, 76 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1954).
83. Brant v. Van Zandt, 77 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1954).
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the existence of a stairway descending from the hallway. She proceeded
and, while attempting to find a light switch, plunged down the stairway,
suffering injuries. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had been
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 3
Infants: Next friend. The plaintiff, eight years prior to this suit and
while still a minor had been injured in an accident while a passenger in
an automobile belonging to the defendant. The plaintiff at that time sued
through her stepfather as next friend for injuries sustained in the accident.
She received a jury verdict of $4,900. This amount was paid over to the
minor's next friend.84 Now having attained her majority, the plaintiff
brings this suit against the same defendant contending that she at no time
received the proceeds of her judgment. The Supreme Court held that the
defendant was not liable to the plaintiff on the judgment under these
circumstances. 85
Negligence: Automobiles. An action was brought for the death of the
plaintiff's husband as the result of a head-on collision of his automobile
and the defendant's automobile. The facts showed that the husband's
automobile went back and forth from one side of the highway to the other
and the defendant drove onto the left side of the highway to avoid the
husband's automobile. He was struck by the husband's automobile when
it suddenly returned to its proper side of the highway. The Circuit Court
entered a judgment on a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. The
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.8 6
Negligence: Principal and agent. The defendant corporation lent its
automobile to the plaintiff's husband, an employee, to be used by him on
a purely personal mission. While driving the car on the highway, with
the knowledge and consent of the owner, the husband wrecked the vehicle.
His wife, a passenger, was injured. The Supreme Court held that the fact
that the plaintiff could not sue her husband for injuries sustained as a result
of his negligence, did not relieve the defendant, as owner of the automobile,
from liability. The principal does not share its agent's personal immunity
from suit.9i
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Evidence. In a workmen's compensation
proceeding, evidence showed that a man employed as a fruit picker was found
dead lying on wet ground near an aluminum ladder. He had been carrying
the ladder in a location immediately beneath electrical wires which were
low enough to have been touched by the ladder. In absence of proof that
death was the result of natural causes, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the finding that the deceased died from electrocution arising out of an
in the scope of his employment.58
84. FLA. STAT. § 45.02 (1953).
85. Moye v. General Motors Corporation, 77 So.2d 875 (Fla. 1955).
86. Burdette v. Phillips, 76 So.2d 805 (Fla. 1954).
87. May v. Palm Beach Chemical Company, 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955).
88. Johnson v. Dicks, 76 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1954).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Master and servant: Third party tort-feasor. The Supreme Court held
that a co-employee or fellow servant is a "third party tort-feasor" within
the Workmen's Compensation Act.89 There is no contract as between
co-employees, and the compensation act does not govern their relationship
with one another. Therefore, a fellow employee whose alleged negligence
resulted in the death of the decednt could be held responsible.,,
Subrogation. A workmen's compensation insurer's subrogation rights
had been fully and completely adjudicated in an action brought by the
injured employee against a third-party tort-feasor. The employee, in a
subsequent proceeding, sought to procure a continuation of the compen-
sation payments. At this point the insurer attacked the validity of the
statute9' under which the award was made. The Supreme Court held
that such rights could not be litigated anew in this proceedings.9 2
Time of review. The application of the employer and the insurance
carrier to review an order of the Deputy Commissioner, granting the em-
ployee's widow compensation, was not timely. 5 More than twenty days
had elapsed between the date the Deputy Commissioner's order was mailed
and the date of presentation of the application to the Deputy Commis-
sioner.
94
Total disability. The claimant for Workmen's Compensation 5 had
suffered the loss of an eye. He had been paid compensation for permanent
partial disability. Thereafter he developed an occupational disease which
left him totally disabled. The Supreme Court held that the claimant
was entitled to full compensation for permanent total disability without
deduction for payments made on account of prior injury.""
ZONING. Change in neighborhood. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
summary decree, supported by affidavits showing the vast change in the
character of the neighborhood since the original zoning of the area as
residential. The Supreme Court held that the evidence of change in
character of the neighborhood was sufficient to sustain the decree. 7
Municipal corporations. The city amended a zoning ordinance so as
to eliminate from permissive uses beachwear, clothing, jewelry and other
similar shops in hotels of 100 rooms or more. The Supreme Court held
that the amendment bears no substantial relation to the health, morals,
welfare or safety of the public. It is discriminatory, unconstitutional and
89. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.01, 768.01 (1953).
90. Frantz v. McBee Company, 77 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1955).
91. FLA. STAT. § 440.39 (3,4) (1953).
92. Arex Indemnity Company v. Radin, 77 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1955).
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (3) (c), (4) (1953),
94. H. W. Sperry, Inc. v. Matthews, 76 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1954).
95. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1), (5)(b) (1953).
96. International Paper Company v. Merchant, 77 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1955).
97. City of Miami v. Ross, 76 So.2d 152 (Fla. 1954).
QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES
void as to a hotel, the construction of which had been planned and com-
menced prior to the amendment.9 8
Municipal corporations. A zoning ordinance amendment purported
to restrict the types of business establishments that could be contained in
hotels with 100 or more guest rooms. The Supreme Court held that this
was arbitrary, discriminatory, and void, in the absence of the showing of a
change in conditions warranting a re-zoning.99
98. City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 428 (Fla, 1954).
99. Charnofree Corporation v. City of Miami Beach, 76 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1954).
